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1 Introduction
It is one of the central questions in industrial organization whether a
competition policy increases welfare.1) When one supposes the simplest
situation in which identical ¯rms compete in a single oligopolistic indus-
try, the above policy raises welfare by eliminating ine±ciency associated
with market power. Is the same still valid even in more realistic situa-
tions? While there is a large literature that addresses this question, Lahiri
and Ono (1988) demonstrate a striking result that if two sets of ¯rms that
* I gratefully acknowledge ¯nancial support from JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number
25285087. Any remaining error is my own.
1) We de¯ne a competition policy simply as increasing the number of ¯rms. Chapters
14 and 16 in Belle°amme and Peitz (2015) provide a comprehensive account of
competition policies.
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di®er in production cost are allowed, an increase in the number of inef-
¯cient ¯rms can reduce welfare. More recently, Shimomura and Thisse
(2012) construct a model in which oligopolistic and monopolistic compe-
tition coexists, and prove that increasing the number of oligopolistic ¯rms
unambiguously enhance welfare although it decreases the number of mo-
nopolistically competitive ¯rms.
This paper also belongs to this strand of literature, but we reconsider
the welfare e®ect of competition policy by applying a general oligopolistic
equilibrium (GOLE) model ¯rst developed by Neary (2003, 2016).2) We
assume a continuum of oligopolistic industries in which entry is impossible
(the number of ¯rms is exogenously given) in one set of industries and
entry is free (the number of ¯rms is endogenously determined) in the other
set of industries. Then, we show that an increase in the number of ¯rms
in the former set of industries can worsen welfare.3)
As noted earlier, Neary (2003, 2016) is the ¯rst to develop the GOLE
model. In particular, Neary (2003) assumes that all oligopolistic indus-
tries have the same number of ¯rms, and shows that increasing it raises
welfare increases unless all industries are identical. Using a GOLE model
in which oligopolistic and perfectly competitive industries coexist, Cret-
tez and Fagart (2009) ¯nd that the same is no longer valid because the
oligopolistic industries may over-produce and the market distortion associ-
ated with this over-production is accelerated by the competition policy. In
addition, Kamei (2014) shows that the competition policy reduces welfare
2) For the detailed account of the GOLE model, see Neary (2003, 2016) and Colacicco
(2015).
3) Supposing a single industry that consists of oligopolistic and monopolistically com-
petitive ¯rms, Shimomura and Thisse (2012) ¯nd that welfare improves as the
oligopolistic ¯rms increase. The main di®erence between their and our models is
whether the competition policy changes the factor price (wage). In Shimomura and
Thisse (2012), the wage is always unity from the pro¯t maximization condition of
the perfectly competitive numeraire sector.
| 32 |
Fujiwara：Losses from competition policy in a general oligopolistic equilibrium
by allowing for economies of scale in the original Neary (2003) model. This
is because the competition policy prevents ¯rms from enjoying the gains
from economies of scale by decreasing output per-¯rm. We also show that
the competition policy can be welfare-reducing, but the underlying reason
is quite di®erent. In our model, the competition policy raises the wage
and leads to crowding out of the ¯rms in the free entry industries, thereby
being welfare-reducing.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model, and
Section 3 proves and discusses the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
This section presents the model. There is a continuum of oligopolistic
industries in a closed interval [0; 1] in which all goods are produced from
labor only. We begin by considering the consumer behavior, and then turn
to the ¯rm behavior. The utility maximization problem of a representative
consumer is given by
max
fcig
Z 1
0
ln cidi subject to
Z 1
0
picidi = I; (1)
where ci and pi is a consumption and price of good i, respectively, and I is
national income. Then, the ¯rst-order condition for utility maximization is
1=ci = ¸pi, where ¸ is a Lagrangean multiplier which represents marginal
utility of income.4) A crucial assumption commonly made in the GOLE
model is that all ¯rms take ¸ as given in maximizing their pro¯t. That
is, oligopolistic ¯rms are `large' in their product market, but `small' in the
whole economy including the factor (labor) market. Given this assumption,
we set ¸ = 1 in what follows.
The continuum of industries consists of a set of industries i 2
h
0;eii in
4) Note that ¸ is an endogenous variable that is determined in the whole general
equilibrium system.
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which entry is restricted (the number of ¯rms is exogenously given) and
a set of industries j 2
hei; 1i in which entry is free so that the number
of ¯rms is endogenously given by the zero-pro¯t condition. Denoting by
m > 1 and nj > 1 the number of ¯rms in the former and latter industries,
the inverse demand function is given by pi = 1=
 Pm
k=1 xik

and pj =
1=
 Pnj
l=1 xjl

, where xik and xjl are the output of a representative ¯rm
in each set of industries.5) The labor input coe±cient ®i di®ers across
industries, and ¯xed labor f > 0 must be employed in the free entry
industries. Summarizing these assumptions, the pro¯t of a representative
¯rm in each set of industries is de¯ned as follows.
¼i ´ pixik ¡ w®ixik; ¼j ´ pjxjl ¡ w®jxjl ¡ wf;
where ¼i and ¼j are the pro¯t, and w is the wage. Assuming Cournot
competition and a symmetry within each industry, the output per ¯rm
and price in industry i are6)
xi =
m¡ 1
m2w®i
; pi =
mw®i
m¡ 1 : (2)
Similarly, the output per ¯rm and price in industry j are
xj =
nj ¡ 1
n2jw®j
; pj =
njw®j
nj ¡ 1 : (3)
Substituting (3) into the zero-pro¯t condition ¼j = 0 and solving for nj ,
the number of ¯rms in the free entry industries is computed as
nj =
1p
wf
; (4)
which turns out to be common for all j 2
hei; 1i.
Thus far, we have assumed that the wage is given to all ¯rms. We now
endogenize it, and describe the full general equilibrium by introducing the
5) We assume that the number of ¯rms m is common for all the restricted entry
industries since the analysis becomes too complicated if it is di®erent.
6) Subscripts k and l are dropped hereafter because all ¯rms within each industry
are identical.
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labor market-clearing condition:
L=
Z ei
0
m®ixidi+
Z 1
ei n (®jxj + f) dj =
m¡ei
mw
;
where L > 0 is the labor endowment, and the last equality uses Eqs. (2),
(3) and (4). Solving this equation for w, the equilibrium wage is explicitly
obtained as
w =
m¡ei
mL
: (5)
Substituting (5) into (2), (3) and (4), the outputs, prices and the number
of ¯rms in the free entry industries are derived, and the model is closed.
Eq. (5) immediately leads to:
Lemma. A competition policy in the form of increasing m raises the
equilibrium wage.
In order to understand the intuition behind this result, let us note that an
increase inm has the following two impacts. An increase inm has a positive
e®ect on aggregate labor demand, and hence the wage will increase. On the
other hand, an increase in m leads some ¯rms in the free entry sectors to
exit, which serves to decrease aggregate labor demand and put downward
pressure on the wage. As a result, the competition policy de¯ned above
has both a positive and negative impact on the equilibrium wage, but it
ends up raising the wage because the former e®ect dominates the latter
e®ect. This e®ect of the competition policy on the equilibrium wage will
be useful in the subsequent arguments.
3 Welfare e®ects
Based on the model in the last section, we address the welfare e®ect of
the competition policy. Substituting the demand functions ci = 1=pi and
cj = 1=pj into the direct utility function in (1), indirect utility or welfare
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W is expressed by
W = ¡
Z ei
0
ln pi ¡
Z 1
ei ln pjdj: (6)
In order to ¯nd how m a®ects pi and pj in (6), we substitute (2), (3) and
(4) into the inverse demand functions pi = 1=(mxi) and pj = 1=(njxj).
Then, these prices become a function of m as follows.
pi =

m¡ei®i
(m¡ 1)L ; pj =
w®j
1¡pwf ; (7)
where w in pj is given by (5). Di®erentiation of these prices with respect
to m leads to
dpi
dm
= ¡

1¡ei®i
(m¡ 1)2L < 0;
dpj
dm
=
@pj
@w
¢ dw
dm
=
ei®j 1¡ pwf2 
m2L
 
1¡pwf2 > 0;
that is, the competition policy lowers pi and raises pj . Relating this e®ect
on prices to Eq. (6), it is generally ambiguous whether the competition
policy enhances welfare.
To seek more, let us substitute (7) into (6), and di®erentiate the resulting
expression with respect to m. Then, the welfare e®ect of increasing m is
derived as follows.
dW
dm
=¡
Z ei
0
1
pi
¢ dpi
dm
di¡
Z 1
ei
1
pj
¢ dpj
dm
dj
=
ei1¡ei
(m¡ 1)

m¡ei ¡
ei1¡ei  2¡pwf
2
 
1¡pwfmm¡ei
=
ei1¡ei¢
2m(m¡ 1)

m¡ei  1¡pwf ;
where ¢´ 2¡ (m+ 1)
p
wf = 2¡
vuut (m+ 1)2 m¡ei f
mL
:
It follows from this result that the welfare e®ect of the competition policy
depends on the sign of ¢. More speci¯cally, we establish:
| 36 |
Fujiwara：Losses from competition policy in a general oligopolistic equilibrium
Proposition. A competition policy in the form of increasing m reduces
welfare if
(m+ 1)2

m¡ei f ¡ 4mL > 0: (8)
Proof. The competition policy is welfare-reducing (dW=dm < 0) if ¢ < 0,
which is rewritten as
2 <
vuut (m+ 1)2 m¡ei f
mL
:
Rearranging this inequality, we arrive at the proposition. jj
It is a little di±cult to know why the competition policy is detrimental
under condition (8). To see this, it is helpful to rewrite (8) as a condition
on m. Noting that inequality (8) is rewritten as
fm3 + f

2¡eim2 + hf 1¡ 2ei¡ 4Lim¡eif > 0;
we can say that the competition policy is welfare-reducing if m is su±-
ciently large. This ¯nding is intuitively explained as follows. When m is
su±ciently large, the pro-competitive e®ect of increasing m is small since
the oligopolistic equilibrium is su±ciently close to the competitive equi-
librium. Therefore, the marginal pro-competitive e®ect of increasing m is
quite small. In contrast, the decrease in nj led by the competition pol-
icy has a negative welfare e®ect, and plays a primary role in the overall
welfare e®ect. In other words, under condition (8), the negative welfare
e®ect arising from crowding out in the free entry industries is overweighs
the positive welfare e®ect from the pro-competitive e®ect. Consequently,
the competition policy decreases welfare.
Remark. The above result rests on the assumption of logarithmic utility.
If, instead, quadratic utility is used as in Neary (2003, 2016), nothing clear
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is obtained.
4 Conclusion
Applying Neary's (2003, 2016) GOLE model to the situation where re-
stricted entry industries and free entry industries coexist, we have shown
a possibility that a competition policy, i.e. an increase in the number of
¯rms in the restricted entry sectors, raises the equilibrium wage and forces
the ¯rms to exit in the free entry sectors, thereby reducing welfare.
Despite that the above result may be useful in competition policy-making,
it is admittedly based on many simplifying assumptions. First, we ignore
product di®erentiation by straightforwardly following Neary (2003, 2016).
If products are di®erentiated within each industry and/or across industries,
our results are expected to be modi¯ed. Second, it is interesting to endo-
genize ei that divides the two sets of industries. In this extended model,
a competition policy a®ects welfare not only through the wage but also
through this threshold of industries. It is our future research agenda to
enrich the analysis by noting these limitations of this paper.
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